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Abstract
We consider the problem of learning from revealed preferences in an online setting. In our
framework, each period a consumer buys an optimal bundle of goods from a merchant according
to her (linear) utility function and current prices, subject to a budget constraint. The merchant
observes only the purchased goods, and seeks to adapt prices to optimize his profits. We give
an efficient algorithm for the merchant’s problem that consists of a learning phase in which the
consumer’s utility function is (perhaps partially) inferred, followed by a price optimization step.
We also consider an alternative online learning algorithm for the setting where prices are set
exogenously, but the merchant would still like to predict the bundle that will be bought by the
consumer for purposes of inventory or supply chain management.
In contrast with most prior work on the revealed preferences problem, we demonstrate that
by making stronger assumptions on the form of utility functions, efficient algorithms for both
learning and profit maximization are possible, even in adaptive, online settings.
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1 Introduction
We consider algorithmic and learning-theoretic aspects of the classical revealed preferences problem.
In this problem, a consumer has a fixed but unknown utility function u over n goods, and is price
sensitive. At each period t, she observes a price vector pt and purchases a (possibly fractional)
bundle of goods xt to maximize her utility given her budget (i.e. xt ∈ arg maxx·pt≤B u(x)). Given
a sequence of T observations (p1, x1), . . . , (pT , xT ) the revealed preferences problem (introduced by
[9]; see [10] for a survey) is to determine whether the observations are consistent with a consumer
optimizing any utility function u, subject to some mild constraints (e.g. monotonicity of u). In this
paper, however, we have different and stronger objectives, motivated by what power the merchant
has to set prices. We consider two scenarios:
(Price-Setting) First, we consider a monopolist merchant who has the power to set prices as
he wishes (without fear of losing the consumer to competition). In this setting, we consider the
natural goal of merchant profit maximization. The merchant has a fixed unit cost associated with
each good, and his profit, when the consumer buys a bundle x, is his revenue minus the cost of the
bundle purchased. The merchant wishes to adaptively set prices so as to minimize his costs, which
in turn maximizes his profits. Every round, the consumer purchases her utility maximizing bundle
subject to the merchant’s prices and her budget constraint. If the merchant knew the consumer’s
utility function, he could optimally set prices, but he does not — instead, the merchant faces a
learning problem. For the case when the consumer has a linear utility function, we give an efficient
algorithm for setting prices to quickly learn the consumer’s utility function and then exploit this
knowledge to set profit-maximizing prices.
(Exogenous Prices) Second, we consider a merchant who cannot unilaterally set prices, but
instead must react to a stream of exogenously chosen prices. This setting is relevant to a seller of
commodity goods, or the owner of a franchise that must set prices given by the parent company.
Despite his lack of control over prices, this merchant would nevertheless like to be able to predict
which bundle the consumer is going to buy in the next period (e.g. to optimize inventory or
streamline the supply chain). The problem remains that the consumer’s utility function is unknown,
and now the price sequence is also unknown and arbitrary (i.e. it could in the worst case be chosen
adaptively, by an adversary). In this setting, when the consumer has a linear utility function, we
give an efficient algorithm with a small mistake bound — in other words, even against an adaptively
chosen set of price vectors, in the worst case over consumer utility functions, our algorithm makes
only a bounded number of mistaken predictions of bundles purchased.
We note that there are a variety of scenarios that fall under the two frameworks above. These
include sponsored search or contextual advertising on the web (where advertisers typically must
obey periodic budget constraints, and prices are set exogenously by the bids of competitors or
endogenously by an ad exchange or publisher); consumers who regularly receive gift certificates
which can only be used for purchases from a single merchant such as Amazon, who in turn has
price-setting powers; consumers with poor self-control who repeatedly spend all of their disposable
income in a single category of goods (e.g. alcohol) from a price-setting merchant (e.g. local liquor
store); and crowdsourcing or labor management settings where a manager (merchant) can set
rewards or payments for a set of daily tasks, and workers (consumers) with a budget of time or
effort select tasks according to the incentives and their own abilities.
From a learning-theoretic point of view, the price-setting framework can be viewed as a form of
query model, since the merchant is free to experiment with prices (both for the purpose of learning
about the consumer, and subsequently in order to optimize profits); while the exogenous price model
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falls into the large literature on adversarial, worst-case online learning. The learning problem we
consider in both settings is unusual, in that the “target function” we are trying to learn is the
vector-valued arg max (optimal bundle) of the consumer’s utility function. Additionally, despite
the linearity of the consumer’s utility function, the merchant’s reward function is a non-convex
function of prices, which further complicates learning.
Our major assumptions — that consumers always spend their entire budget, that there is one
divisible unit of each good available in each round, and that consumers repeatedly return to the same
merchant — are standard in the classic revealed preferences model (see e.g. textbook treatments in
[7] and [8]). In order to provide efficient learning algorithms in this setting, we necessarily impose
additional restrictions on the form of the consumer’s utility function. In particular, we assume
that the utility function is linear, and that the coefficients are discretized and lower-bounded. The
discretization assumption is necessary to learn the utility function exactly, which is required for
the merchant’s optimization. Even if two functions differ by an arbitrarily small amount, they can
induce the consumer to buy very different bundles. We also assume an upper bound on prices, and
without loss of generality we rescale this upper bound to be 1. Without such an assumption, the
merchant could maximize his profits by setting all prices to infinity. Unbounded prices are neither
founded in reality, nor lead to an interesting optimization problem.
1.1 Our Results
We first consider the case of a monopolist merchant who has the ability to set prices arbitrarily, and
is facing a consumer with an unknown linear utility function. In this setting, we give an algorithm
with bounded regret with respect to the optimal (profit-maximizing) set of prices in hindsight. Our
argument proceeds in two steps. We first show that, if we knew the consumer’s utility function u,
then we could efficiently compute the optimal profit-maximizing prices p∗:
Theorem 1 (Informal). There is an efficient algorithm (running in time O(n2 log n)), which given
as input the linear consumer utility function u, outputs the profit-maximizing prices p∗.
The analysis of this algorithm first assumes we know only the set of goods purchased by the
consumer under optimal prices (but not the optimal prices themselves), and introduces a family
of linear programs with one free parameter. We then show there is a small set of values for this
parameter, one of which yields the optimal prices.
Note that although the consumer ’s optimization problem when selecting a bundle to purchase
given prices is simply a fractional knapsack problem, the problem of computing optimal prices
is substantially more complex. The optimal price vector p∗ is actually a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium strategy for the merchant in a two-stage extensive form game between the merchant
and the consumer (the merchant first picks prices, and then the consumer best responds). Viewed
in this way, the fractional knapsack problem that the consumer solves at the second stage is simply
her best response function; what we give is an algorithm for computing the merchant’s subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy in the first stage of this game. Note that doing this in polynomial time
is non-trivial, because the merchant’s strategy space is continuous (and even after discretization,
is exponentially large).
We next give an algorithm that learns the consumer’s unknown linear utility function by making
price queries. A price query specifies a price vector, and receives in return the bundle purchased
by the consumer. The key metric of interest here is the number of queries necessary to learn the
utility function. We prove the following theorem:
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Theorem 2 (Informal). There is an efficient algorithm that learns, after at most O(n) price
queries, the utility coefficients for all goods except those that are so preferred they will be bought
regardless of prices.
This algorithm has two phases. In the first phase, after setting all prices to 1 (the maximum
possible price), the algorithm gradually lowers the price of unpurchased items in succession until
they are purchased, thus learning the ratio of their utility coefficient to that of the least preferred
good purchased under the price vector of all 1s. Note that learning a relative rather than exact
coefficient value is sufficient because the bundle bought by the consumer (i.e. the solution to the
knapsack problem) is unchanged by a scaling of the coefficients. Indeed, because of this property,
it is impossible for any algorithm to learn the exact values.
The harder coefficients to learn are those corresponding to goods purchased even when all prices
are 1 — these are the consumer’s most preferred goods. Some of these are learned by gradually
lowering the prices of unpurchased goods until a switch of purchased goods occurs; for the ones
that cannot be learned via this procedure, we prove that they are so favored they will be purchased
under any prices, so learning their coefficients is not necessary for price optimization.
Finally, we put these two algorithms together to prove our first main result:
Theorem 3 (Informal). There is a price-setting algorithm that, when interacting with a consumer
with an unknown linear utility function for T rounds, achieves regret O(n2/T ) to the profit obtained
by the optimal (profit-maximizing) price vector.
In the last part of the paper, we consider the case of a commodity merchant who does not
have the power to set prices. The merchant wishes to predict the bundles that a consumer with an
unknown linear utility function will buy, in the face of a stream of arbitrary price vectors. Here,
the main quantity of interest is how many mistakes we make (by predicting the incorrect bundle)
in the worst case over both consumer utility functions and sequences of price vectors. We call this
the mistake bound of the algorithm (by analogy to the mistake bounded model of learning). Here
we prove our second main result:
Theorem 4 (Informal). There exists a polynomial time algorithm in the online exogenous price
model that has a mistake bound of O(n2) with high probability.
1.2 Related Work
The work most directly related to our results is the recent paper of Balcan et al. [2], which was
conducted independently and concurrently. They study the problem of learning from revealed
preferences in various settings, including in a query model related to the model we study here.
Our “price queries” differ slightly from the queries in the Balcan et al. model, in that our learner
can only specify prices, whereas the learner from Balcan et al. can specify prices, as well as the
consumer’s budget with each query. However, the main distinction between our work and theirs is
that our goal is profit maximization (even if we do not exactly learn the buyer’s utility function),
and the goal of Balcan et al [2] is to exactly learn the buyer’s utility function — they do not consider
the profit maximization problem.
More broadly, there is a long line of work on the revealed preference problem, which was first
introduced by Samuelson [9]. For a textbook introduction to the standard model, see [7] and [8],
and for a survey of recent work, see [10]. Most previous efforts have focused on the construction of
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utility functions that explain a finite sequence of price/bundle observations. Afriat’s Theorem [1]
is the seminal result in this field, and proves that a sequence of observations is rationalizable (i.e.
can be explained by a utility function) if and only if the sequence is rationalizable by a piecewise
linear, monotone, concave utility function. The proof is by construction, and therefore yields a
“learning” algorithm for this large class of utility functions. However, the hypothesis generated has
description length proportional to the number of observations, and hence although it can explain
previous observations, it usually does not generalize to predict the bundles purchased given new
price vectors.
The problem of finding a utility function that is both consistent and predictive was first con-
sidered by Beigman and Vohra [3], who formalize the statement that “Afriat’s Theorem Learners”
do not generalize. [3] studies a PAC-like learning model in which they assume a distribution over
observations and seek to find a hypothesis that performs well on future observations drawn from
the same distribution. Their results essentially show that it is only possible to find predictive hy-
potheses if we restrict the class of allowable utility functions beyond those that are rationalizable.
Roth and Zadimoghaddam [11] extended this line of work by providing computationally efficient
learning algorithms for two specific classes of utility functions — linear and linearly separable and
concave utility functions. Cummings, Echenique, and Wierman [4] consider the revealed preferences
problem when the consumer can strategically choose bundles to subvert the merchant’s learning. In
this setting, they show that without assuming the consumer’s utility function is linearly separable,
the merchant is unable to learn anything. Like this previous work, we also seek to find predictive
hypotheses for the class of linear utility functions, but we consider two new learning models: one
in which prices are directly controlled, rather than observed (which corresponds to a query model
of learning), and furthermore we wish to learn optimal prices; and one in which prices are chosen
adversarially and adaptively, and arrive online (which corresponds to online learning in the mistake
bound model).
Our results in the second model are inspired by the classic halving algorithm for the online
learning setting, which is credited to Littlestone [6]. The approach is simple but powerful: given
a finite set of hypotheses and a sequence of observations, predict according to the majority of
remaining hypotheses, and then discard all hypotheses that made a mistake. To implement the
algorithm efficiently, we instead maintain a continuous hypothesis space from which we predict
using a randomly sampled hypothesis (rather than predicting using a majority vote). We track
the volume of the hypothesis space (rather than the number of consistent hypotheses), and show
that after a bounded number of mistakes, we must have learned one coefficient of the consumer
valuation function.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a set of n divisible goods that a merchant wishes to sell to a consumer. We represent a
bundle of goods x ∈ [0, 1]n by a vector specifying what fraction of each of the n goods is purchased.
The consumer has an unknown utility function u : [0, 1]n → R specifying her utility for each possible
bundle. The merchant has the power to set prices (one for each good), also represented by a vector
p ∈ [0, 1]n (we normalize so that the price of every good i is pi ≤ 1). Written in this way, the price
of a bundle x is simply x · p = ∑ni=1 pi · xi. Finally, the consumer behaves as follows: facing a
price vector p, the consumer purchases her most preferred bundle subject to a budget constraint
B ≥ 0. That is, she purchases a bundle in arg maxx·p≤B u(x). There may not always be a unique
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utility-maximizing bundle for the consumer, and so we let X(u, p,B) = arg maxx·p≤B u(x), the
set-valued collection of utility-maximizing bundles. If X(u, p,B) is a singleton set, we say that
the consumer’s choice is uniquely specified by p. We assume the budget is fixed and known to the
merchant (although if the budget were unknown, the merchant could learn it from a single price
query).
We restrict our attention to linear utility functions, which are defined by a valuation vector
v ∈ Rn such that u(x) = x · v. We assume the valuations are discretized to some increment δ; i.e.
each vi ∈ {0, δ, 2δ, . . . , 1}. For this family of utility functions, the consumer’s optimization problem
to compute X(u, p,B) is a fractional knapsack problem. The capacity of the knapsack is B, and
the weight and value of a good i are pi and vi, respectively. This problem can be solved greedily by
ranking the goods in decreasing order of their vi/pi (i.e. bang per buck) ratios, and then buying
in this order until the budget is exhausted. Note that in the optimal bundle, there will be at most
one fractionally purchased good. Since this ratio is important in many of our algorithms, given u
and p, we will denote vi/pi by ri(u, p), or by ri when u and p are clear from context. If ri ≤ rj we
say that the consumer prefers item i to item j.
We consider two problem variants. In the first, the merchant has the power to set prices, and has
a production cost ci ≤ 1 for each good i. Hence, the merchant’s profit when the consumer buys a
bundle x at prices p is x·(p−c). It always improves the consumer’s utility to saturate her budget and
so x·p = B for any x ∈ X(u, p,B) and x·(p−c) = B−x·c. Hence, maximizing the merchant’s profit is
equivalent to minimizing his costs x·c. The merchant’s goal is to obtain profit close to the maximum
possible profit OPT = maxp∈[0,1]n maxx∈X(u,p,B) x · (p− c) = maxp∈[0,1]n maxx∈X(u,p,B)B − x · c.
Note that solving this problem requires both learning something about the unknown utility
function u, as well as the ability to solve the optimization problem given u. At every round t,
the algorithm chooses some price vector pt, and the consumer responds by selecting any consistent
xt ∈ X(u, pt, B). We measure our success over T time steps with respect to our regret to the
optimal profit the merchant could have obtained had he priced optimally at every round, which is
defined as
Regret(p1, . . . , pT ) = OPT− 1
T
T∑
t=1
xt · (pt − c)
In the second variant, we view price vectors p1, . . . , pT arriving one at a time, chosen (possibly
adversarially) by Nature. In this setting, the merchant has no control over the bundle purchased by
the consumer, and wish only to predict it. At each time step t, after learning pt, we get to predict
a bundle xˆt. Following our prediction, we observe the bundle xt ∈ X(u, pt, B) actually purchased.
We say that we make a mistake if xˆt 6= xt, and our goal is to design an algorithm that makes a
bounded number of mistakes in the worst case over both u and the sequence of prices p1, . . . , pT .
3 Maximizing Profit in the Price-Setting Model
We begin by considering the first model, in which the merchant controls prices, and seeks to max-
imize profit. First we show that, given the coefficients vi of the consumer’s linear utility function,
we can efficiently compute the profit-maximizing prices. We will then combine this algorithm with
a query algorithm for learning the coefficients, thus yielding an online no-regret pricing algorithm.
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3.1 Computing Optimal Prices Offline
In this section we assume that all the coefficients vi of the consumer’s utility function are known
to the merchant. Even then, it is not clear a priori that there exists an efficient algorithm for
computing a profit-maximizing price vector p. As previously mentioned, the optimal prices are a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for the merchant in a two-stage extensive form game, in
which the merchant has exponentially many strategies. Straightforwardly computing this equilib-
rium strategy via backwards induction would therefore be inefficient. We show that nevertheless,
this task can be accomplished in time only (nearly) quadratic in the number of goods.
The key to the algorithm’s efficiency will stem from the observation that there exists a restricted
family of pricing vectors P ⊂ [0, 1]n containing a (nearly) profit-maximizing vector p∗. This subset
P will still be exponentially large in n, but will be “derived” (in a manner which will be made
more precise) from a small set of vectors p(1), ..., p(n). This derivation will allow the algorithm to
efficiently search for p∗. We define p(k) by letting p(k)i = min(vi/vk, 1). In other words, the price of
every good whose value is less than the kth good is set to the ratio vi/vk. Otherwise, if vi > vk,
the price of good i in p(k) is set to the ceiling of 1.
To understand the operation of the algorithm, consider the consumer’s behavior under the prices
p(k). Any good priced at vi/vk will have a bang per buck ratio ri = vk. Therefore, the consumer’s
choice is not uniquely specified by p(k) in general (since the consumer is indifferent between any
of the previously mentioned goods). Moreover, the consumer’s choice will have great impact on
the merchant’s profit since the goods between which the consumer is indifferent might have very
different production costs ci. The algorithm therefore proceeds by computing, for each p
(k), which
bundle x(k) the merchant would like the consumer to purchase under p(k). More precisely, for each
k, the algorithm computes x(k) ∈ arg maxx∈X(u,p(k),B) x · (p(k) − c). Note that if the merchant were
to actually play the price vector p(k), the consumer would be under no obligation in our model
to respond by selecting x(k). Therefore, the final step of the algorithm is to output a price vector
which attains nearly optimal profit, but for which the consumer’s behavior is uniquely specified.
The pseudocode is given in Algorithm OptPrice. The analysis proceeds by proof of three key
facts. (1) For some k, the optimal profit is attained by (p(k), x(k)), or rather, OPT = x(k) · (p(k)− c)
for some k. (2) Given any p(k), x(k) can be computed efficiently (in O(n log n) time). Finally, (3)
there is some price pˆ for which the consumer’s choice x is uniquely specified, and where x · (pˆ− c)
is close to OPT.
Theorem 1. Algorithm OptPrice (which runs in time O(n2 log n)), takes coefficients v1, . . . , vn as
input and for any  > 0, computes prices pˆ for which the consumer’s choice xˆ is uniquely specified
and achieves profit x(pˆ− c) ≥ OPT− .
Proof. We prove the above theorem by establishing the three key facts listed above. The first key
lemma establishes that optimal profit is attained by some (p(k), x(k)) for some k.
Lemma 1. Let p(k) be the pricing vector such that p
(k)
i = min(vi/vk, 1). For any consumer utility
parameterized by (u,B), there exists some k and an x ∈ X(u, p(k), B), such that OPT = x·(p(k)−c).
Proof. Fix u and B. Consider a profit-maximizing price p∗, and corresponding bundle x∗ ∈
X(u, p∗, B), so that OPT = x∗ · (p∗− c). Let O = {i : x∗i > 0} be the set of purchased goods in x∗.
If there is a fractionally purchased good in x∗, we denote its index by f (i.e. 0 < x∗f < 1).
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Algorithm OptPrice(B, v, c, , δ)
for k = 1 to n do
p
(k)
i = min(vi/vk, 1) for all i
x(k) = arg maxx∈X(u,p(k),B) x · (p(k) − c) . O(n log n) computation
Profit(k) = x(k) · (p(k) − c)
kmax = arg maxk Profit(k)
p∗ = p(kmax), x∗ = x(kmax)
for i = 1 to n do
if x∗i = 0 then
pˆi = 1
else if x∗i = 1 then
pˆi = p
∗
i − 
else
pˆi = p
∗
i − δ
return pˆ
We note that there must exist a threshold τ such that ri(u, p
∗) ≤ τ whenever i 6∈ O and
ri(u, p
∗) ≥ τ whenever i ∈ O. In words, in order for the bundle x∗ to maximize the consumer’s
utility, the bang per buck of every purchased good must be at least as large as the bang per buck of
every unpurchased good. If there is a fractional good in x∗, we take τ to be rf (u, p∗). Otherwise,
we take it to be maxi 6∈O ri(u, p∗), the bang per buck of the most desirable unpurchased good.
Given τ , we can write the linear program in (1). We claim that any solution to this LP is
also a profit-maximizing price. More precisely, if p(LP ) is a solution to the LP, then there is an
x(LP ) ∈ X(u, p(LP ), B) such that OPT = x(LP )(p(LP ) − c). The following argument proves this
claim.
max
∑
i∈O
pi
s.t. vi/pi ≥ τ ∀i ∈ O
vi/pi ≤ τ ∀i /∈ O
pi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [n]
(1)
We can straightforwardly characterize any solution p(LP ) to the LP. Note that the constraints
on pi are disjoint, and therefore for each i ∈ O, pi can increased independently until a constraint
is saturated. Thus, the LP is optimized by setting p
(LP )
i = min{vi/τ, 1} for each i ∈ O, and
p
(LP )
i ≥ vi/τ for each i 6∈ O (which is always possible since p∗ is a feasible solution).
The LP constraints imply that, under p(LP ), the consumer (weakly) prefers any good in O to
any good not in O. Moreover, if there is a fractional good, the definition of τ ensures that any good
in O \ {f} is preferred to f . Finally, we know that ∑i∈O p∗i ≤ ∑i∈O p(LP )i since p∗ is a feasible
solution to the LP. This, along with the preference ordering on goods imposed by p∗, tells us that
the consumer can saturate her budget at least as quickly under p(LP ) as under p∗. In other words,
under p(LP ), the consumer may saturate her budget before purchasing all goods in O \ {f}, or may
require a smaller allocation of good f , but she will never require a larger allocation of good f or
purchase any goods not in O. More precisely, there exists an x(LP ) ∈ X(u, p(LP ), B) such that
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point-wise x
(LP )
i ≤ x∗i . Thus, OPT = x∗(p∗ − c) = B − x∗ · c ≤ B − x(LP ) · c = x(LP ) · (p(LP ) − c),
and so p(LP ) must be a profit-maximizing price.
We have established that p(LP ), which sets pi = min(vi/τ, 1), is profit-maximizing, and now
need only to show that we can take τ = vk for some k. Consider again a profit-maximizing price
p∗ and corresponding bundle x∗. Notice that for any i 6∈ O, we can modify prices to set p∗i = 1,
and (x∗, p∗) will still maximize profit because this change only makes the unpurchased goods more
undesirable. Notice that with this modification, maxi 6∈O ri(u, p∗) = maxi 6∈O vi = vk∗ for some k∗.
Next consider modifying the price of the fractional good. The price of f can be increased to vf/vk∗
if vf/vk∗ < 1, and 1 otherwise. This increases the price of f while still keeping it as the fractionally
purchased good, thus reducing the merchant’s cost. This will result in either rf = vk∗ or rf = vf .
In either case, there exists a (x∗, p∗) such that τ = vk for some k. Thus an optimal price p(LP ) can
be derived by searching over at most n possible values of τ , and sets pi = min(vi/vk, 1) for some
vk. (Lemma 1)
Lemma 1 establishes that for some k, p(k) is optimal, in the sense that there exists an x(k) ∈
X(u, p(k), B) such that OPT = x(k)(p(k) − c). The algorithm proceeds by computing for each such
p(k), the most profitable bundle (for the merchant) that the consumer (who is indifferent between all
bundles in X(u, p(k), B)) could purchase. X(u, p(k), B) is potentially a very large set. For example,
if the consumer has identical values for all goods (i.e. vi ≡ c for all i), and p(k) is the all-1s vector,
then X(u, p(k), B) contains any budget-saturating allocation. Despite the potential size of this set,
Lemma 2 shows that computing maxx∈X(u,p(k),B) x · (p − c) simply requires solving a fractional
knapsack instance, this time from the merchant’s perspective.
Lemma 2. For any p, u, and B, maxx∈X(u,p,B) x · (p− c) = B−x · c can be computed in O(n log n)
time.
Proof. Let p be an arbitrary price vector. The bundle maxx∈X(u,p,B)B − x · c can be computed as
follows. First sort the ri in decreasing order, so that ri1 ≥ ... ≥ rin . The consumer will buy goods
in this order until the budget B is exhausted. Thus, we can simulate the consumer’s behavior
by iteratively “buying” goods and decrementing the budget. The consumer’s behavior is uniquely
specified unless we reach some sequence of goods with rij = rij+1 = . . . = rij+d , with B
′ budget
remaining, where
∑d
l=0 pij+l > B
′. In other words, the consumer’s behavior is unique unless she is
indifferent between some set of goods, and can select different subsets of these goods to exhaust
her remaining budget B′.
In that case, we know that for any bundle x ∈ X(u, p,B), xil = 1 if l < j, and xil = 0 if
l > j + d. For the remaining goods, the merchant’s profit is maximized when x · c is minimized.
This occurs when the consumer saturates the remaining budget B′ while minimizing the cost c to
the merchant. This is an instance of min-cost fractional knapsack wherein the size of the goods are
pij , ..., pij+d and the cost of the goods are cij , ..., cij+d . A solution to this problem can be computed
greedily, so the most profitable bundle for p can be computed with at most two sorts (first for ri
then for pi/ci). (Lemma 2)
Finally, to induce the consumer to buy the bundle x∗, rather than another member ofX(u, p∗, B),
we perturb the vector p∗ slightly, and show that this has an arbitrarily small effect on profit.
Lemma 3. For any  > 0, there exists a price vector pˆ that uniquely specifies a bundle xˆ that
satisfies xˆ · (pˆ− c) ≥ OPT− .
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Proof. Recall that the merchant would like the consumer to purchase the bundle x∗, which is a
member of the set X(u, p∗, B). Even if the merchant sets prices at p∗, there is no guarantee that
the consumer will purchase x∗ rather than some other bundle in the set. Our goal is to output a
vector pˆ that results from perturbing p∗ slightly, so that the consumer will always purchase some xˆ
that is arbitrarily close to x∗. For any good i such that x∗i = 0 (a good that consumer should not
buy at all), we simply set pˆi = 1. For any good i such that x
∗
i = 1 (a good that that the consumer
should buy in its entirety), we set pˆi = p
∗
i − 0. Finally, for any good i such that 0 < x∗i < 1 (a
good that the consumer should buy fractionally), we set pˆi = p
∗
i − δ0.
We claim that these perturbations ensure that the consumer will buy goods in the order desired
by the merchant. First, note that these prices will never cause an item that was not purchased in
x∗ to be preferred to anything that was purchased in x∗. Consider an item i such that x∗i = 0.
Before we perturbed prices, all purchased goods were (weakly) preferred to i. Now these purchased
items have even lower prices, making them (strictly) more appealing, while i retains its same bang
per buck. Thus the purchased goods in x∗ are all now (strictly) preferred to i.
Second, the new prices will never cause an item that was fully purchased in x∗ to be purchased
after the fractional good of x∗. Consider a good i such that x∗i = 1, and the fractional good f such
that 0 < x∗f < 1. Suppose we perturb prices such that pˆi = p
∗
i − , and pˆf = p∗f − /γ, and therefore
must decide how large γ needs to be to satisfy our claim. For our claim to be true, we need the
new bang per buck of good i is strictly higher than the new bang per buck of good f . That is, we
want:
vi
p∗i − 
>
vf
p∗f − /γ
which is equivalent to:
γ >
vi
p∗fvi − vf (p∗i − )
Recall that i was purchased before f under p∗, so i previously had a bigger bang per buck than f ,
and therefore p∗fvi − vfp∗1 ≥ 0. So it is sufficient to choose γ > vivf  =
vi
vf
. We know that each value
lies in the range [δ, 1], so this fraction is maximized at vi = 1, vf = δ, and we can take γ = 1/δ.
Next we must show that the new prices only cause a small reduction in profit. We have decreased
each price by at most 0, so the consumer might have up to an additional n0 budget to spend.
Recall that optimal prices are chosen by the algorithm to be pi = min(vi/vk, 1) for each i and for
some k. Because values are discretized and lower-bounded, the minimum price possible is therefore
δ. Consider setting 0 = δ/n, which yields at most δ additional budget. Then the consumer can
afford to purchase at most an additional δ/δ =  fraction of a good. In the worst case, if this good
is of maximum cost 1, the merchant will incur an additional cost of . (Lemma 3)
(Theorem 1)
3.2 Learning Consumer Valuations
We now provide a query algorithm for learning the coefficients vi of the consumer’s utility function.
For the analysis only, we assume without loss of generality that the goods are ordered by decreasing
value, i.e. v1 > . . . > vn. Our algorithm can learn the values in some suffix of this unknown ordering;
the values that cannot be learned are irrelevant for setting optimal prices, since those goods will
always be purchased by the consumer.
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Theorem 2. Algorithm LearnVal, given the ability to set prices, after at most O(n log((1−δ)/δ2))
price queries, outputs the ratio vi/vn for all goods i except those that will be bought under all price
vectors, when values are discretized by δ.
Algorithm LearnVal(δ)
pi = 1 ∀i . First price query
x← consumer1(p)
while ¬∃i such that 0 < xi < 1 do . Find some fractionally bought good
Choose k such that xk = 0
pk = pk − δ
x← consumer(p)
j = i . j is least-preferred purchased good
for k = j + 1 to n do . Learn sk for j + 1, . . . , n
while xk = 0 do
pk = pk − δ
x← consumer(p)
vk/vj = pk
sk = (vk/vj)/(vn/vj) ∀k ≥ j . Renormalize ratios
for k = j − 1 to 1 do . Learn sk for j − 1, . . . , 1
for α = 1 to δ (in increments of δ) do
pi = 1 i ≤ k
pi = αsi ∀i > k
x← consumer(p)
if xk > 0 then
sk = 1/α
break
if sk is undefined then . k was always bought
break
return s
1The notation x← consumer(p) specifies the bundle bought by the consumer at prices p.
Proof. Algorithm LearnVal proceeds by making price queries. That is, on each day we choose a
particular price vector, observe the bundle purchased at those prices, and then use this information
as part of the learning process. For our first query, we set pi = 1 for all i and observe the bundle x
bought by the consumer. Let j be the index of the least-preferred good that the consumer purchases
under this price vector. If the consumer buys some good i fractionally (which the algorithm can
observe), then j = i. Otherwise, to learn j, we can incrementally lower the price of some good k
that the consumer did not purchase, until k is purchased instead of another good i. Then we have
learned j = i.
In the next phase of this algorithm, we will learn the ratio vk/vj for all goods k > j that were
not originally purchased. To do so, we lower pk (while keeping all other prices at 1) until item k
is purchased. This will occur when vk/pk = vj/pj , or vk/vj = pk. Recall that we assume each
vi is discretized to a multiple of δ. Therefore to guarantee that we learn the ratio vk/vj exactly,
10
we must learn the ratio up to a precision of mink 6=k′ |(vk − vk′)|/vj . This quantity is minimized at
vk = vk′ + δ and vj = 1 (because vj ≤ 1), so it is sufficient to learn the ratio to within ±δ. Thus
if we perform a discrete binary search on pk, it will require O(n log(1/δ)) steps to exactly identify
the desired ratio. Finally, we renormalize the ratios we have learned in terms of vn. That is, for all
k ≥ j, we define sk = vk/vn = (vk/vj)/(vn/vj).
We next attempt to learn sk = vk/vn for all k < j. These are the most preferred goods that
were originally purchased under the all-1s price vector. We learn sk inductively in decreasing order
of k, so as we learn sk, we already know the value si for all i > k. The goal is to now set prices so
that the consumer will be indifferent to all goods i > k (i.e. will have a tie in the bang per buck
for all these goods). The bang per buck on these goods is initially set low, and gradually raised by
adjusting prices. At some critical point, a switch in the behavior of the consumer will be observed
in which k is no longer purchased, and sk is learned.
We therefore introduce a parameter α, which controls the bang per buck ratio of goods k +
1, . . . , n. Define p(α, k) to be the price vector where pi = 1 for i ≤ k, and pi = αsk for i > k.
Let r(α, k) denote the corresponding bang per buck vector; i.e. r(α, k)i = vi/pi. It is easy to see
that r(α, k) = (v1, . . . , vk, vn/α, . . . , vn/α). Thus, by lowering α, we lower the prices and raise the
desirability of goods k+1, . . . , n. This process is illustrated in Figure 1, whereby gradually lowering
α from 1, we eventually reach a first point where goods k + 1, ..., n are preferred to good k. This
switch occurs when the bang per buck ratio of goods k + 1, . . . , n equals the bang per buck ratio
of k, i.e. vn/α = vk, or α = vn/vk. Our goal will be to identify this value of α, which we denote
α∗(k). Once we know α∗(k), we will have learned sk, since sk = vk/vn = 1/α∗(k).
We will know that we have found α∗(k) when we identify the highest value of α for which some
good goes from being purchased to unpurchased. This good must be k, because as we decrease
α, we increase the desirability of goods k + 1, . . . , n, so none of these goods will go from being
purchased to unpurchased. Of goods 1, . . . , k, good k is the least preferred, so this will be the first
good to become unpurchased.
To learn the value of α∗(k) = vn/vk exactly, we must have a precision of mink 6=k′ |vn(|1/vk −
1/vk′ |). This quantity is minimized at vn = δ (because we assume a lower bound on values, and
therefore vn ≥ δ), vk = 1, and vk′ = 1 − δ, and the corresponding value is δ2/(1 − δ). Thus,
we should search for the critical α∗(k) over the interval [0, 1] in increments of this size. In the
algorithm’s implementation, we can perform a binary rather than linear search over the range of
α, which therefore requires requires O(n log((1 − δ)/δ2)) steps. Once we have identified the value
of α∗(k) to within δ2/1− δ, we set sk = 1/α∗(k).
In this manner, we can inductively find the next ratio sk−1 by equalizing preferences for the
later goods and searching for the critical α∗(k−1). The only problem that might arise is that good
k is sufficiently valued, and the budget sufficiently large, such that good k is always purchased no
matter how low α is set. Lemma 4 shows that if this occurs for some k, then no matter how we
price goods 1, . . . , k, the consumer will always purchase these goods in full. Thus for the purposes
of setting prices optimally for the merchant, it is unnecessary to learn the values of these goods,
since he can set the corresponding prices to the maximum of 1.
Lemma 4. If goods 1, . . . , k are purchased at price vector p(α′, k), where α′ = α∗(k)− δ2/(1− δ),
then goods 1, . . . , k will be purchased at any price vector.
Proof. Consider the corresponding bang per buck vector r(α′, k). For i ≤ k, r(α′, k)i = vi ≥ vk,
and for i < k, r(α′, k)i > vk. Thus, good k has the lowest bang per buck of all goods. Since good
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Figure 1: An illustration of the process by which we search over α. The figure depicts the situation just
before hitting the critical point α∗(k). By lowering α slightly, we will raise the bang per buck vn/α of all
goods k + 1, . . . , n (represented by the horizontal red line) to be slightly larger than vk, and the consumer
now prefers these goods to good k.
k is still purchased, all other goods i 6= k must be purchased as well. Consider raising the price of
some good j from its price under p(α′, k), so that good j becomes less desirable. It must be that
j > k, because all other prices are already maximized at 1, so this does not change the fact that
goods 1, . . . , k will be purchased. Next consider lowering the price of some good j. This simply
frees up more of the consumer’s budget and allows the consumer more purchasing power, so all
goods will remain purchased. (Lemma 4)
The last phase of the algorithm is the bottleneck, and so the overall running time (i.e. number
of queries made) is O(n log((1 − δ)/δ2)), which is linear in the bit description length of values.
(Theorem 2)
3.3 Putting It All Together
We now combine the previous two sections into a complete online, no-regret algorithm. The informal
description of Algorithm ProfitMax is as follows. First we use Algorithm LearnVal to learn all
possible si ratios. For any good i for which we did not learn si, we set pi at 1. Then we apply
Algorithm OptPrice to the subset of remaining goods, using the si ratios as input. The following
main result shows that this approach achieves no-regret.
Theorem 3. For any  > 0, after T rounds, Algorithm ProfitMax achieves per-round regret
O((n2/T ) log((1− δ)/δ2)) to the profit obtained by the optimal price vector (where  is the additive
approximation to the optimal profit and δ is the discretization of values).
Proof. First we show that this algorithm correctly composes Algorithms LearnVal and OptPrice
and indeed generates an approximately optimal price vector p.
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Algorithm ProfitMax(B, c, δ, , T )
Profit = 0
s← LearnVal(δ) . Learn si ratios
for i = 1 to n do
if si = 0 then
pi = 1
v = {si | si ≥ 0}
p← OptPrice(B, v, c, ) . Compute optimal prices
while t ≤ T do . Set prices optimally
xt ← consumer(p)
Profit = Profit + xt · (p− c)
Lemma 5. An approximately optimal pricing for goods {1, . . . , n} is obtained by setting pi = 1 for
all goods for which Algorithm LearnVal could not learn si, and then applying Algorithm OptPrice
to the si ratios of the remaining goods.
Proof. According to Lemma 4, for any good i for which Algorithm LearnVal could not learn si, the
consumer will always purchase i, regardless of pi. Thus, our profit is maximized by setting pi = 1.
Furthermore, recall that the bundle bought by the consumer is invariant to scaling, and so the con-
sumer will buy the same bundle regardless of whether we price according to the si = vi/vn ratios
or the actual vi values. Because our profit depends only on the bundle bought, it is therefore suf-
ficient to use Algorithm OptPrice to price approximately optimally for the si ratios. (Lemma 5)
As the above lemma shows, every time we price according to p, we receive approximately optimal
profit. In particular, according to Theorem 1, our profit will be less than OPT by at most , for
any  > 0. Furthermore, Algorithm LearnVal uses at most O(n log((1 − δ)/δ2)) price queries,
so there are O(n log((1 − δ)/δ2)) days on which we might incur maximum regret. On any given
day, the maximum possible profit is B, while the minimum possible is B − n, yielding a maximum
regret of n. Thus, our overall per-step regret is bounded by O((n2/T ) log((1− δ)/δ2) + ). Setting
 = (n2/T ) log((1− δ)/δ2) yields the bound in the theorem statement. (Theorem 3)
4 Predicting Bundles in the Exogenous Price Model
We now consider our second model, in which an arbitrary and possibly adversarially selected price
vector arrives every day, and the goal of our algorithm is to predict the bundle purchased by the
consumer. Recall that the motivating scenario for such a setting is a merchant who is forced
to set prices according to the market or the choices of a parent company. At each day t, the
algorithm observes a price vector pt and makes a prediction xˆt. The algorithm then learns the
bundle purchased, xt ∈ X(u, pt, B), and is said to make a mistake if xt 6= xˆt. Our goal is to prove
an upper bound on the total number of mistakes ever made by our algorithm, in the worst case
over price vectors and utility functions. We call such an upper bound a mistake bound.
We first informally describe the algorithm, given more precisely as Algorithm ExogLearnVal.
The algorithm maintains the set of valuation vectors v consistent with the observations seen thus far:
initially this feasible set is simply C0 = [0, 1]
n. At every round t, the observed pair (pt, xt) provides
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a set of linear constraints which we add to further constrain our feasible set Ct. In particular, we
have the following lemma, first observed in [11].
Lemma 6 ([11]). For any pair of goods i, j ∈ [n] where xti > xtj, it must be that vi/pti ≥ vj/ptj.
This lemma follows immediately from the fact that the vector xt is the solution to a fractional
knapsack problem, for which the optimal algorithm is to buy goods in decreasing order of vi/p
t
i.
The set of all such constraints learned so far at time t forms the feasible set Ct, which is a convex
polytope. The idea of the algorithm is to sample a hypothesis valuation function vt uniformly at
random from Ct at each stage, and predict using the bundle that would be purchased if the buyer
had valuation function vt. The event that this hypothesis makes a mistake in its prediction is
exactly the event that the hypothesis is eliminated when we update the consistent set to Ct+1, and
so the probability of making a mistake is exactly equal to the fraction of volume eliminated from
our consistent set, which allows us to charge our mistakes to the final volume of our consistent set.
However, we need a way to lower bound the final volume of our consistent set.
We define the width of a polytope K in dimension i as widthi(K) = maxx,y∈K |xi − yi|. Note
that the width can be efficiently computed using a linear program. We take advantage of the fact
that the true valuation function takes values that are discretized to multiples of δ. Hence, if at any
point the width of our consistent set Ct in some dimension i is less than δ/2, then we can exactly
identify the ith coefficient of the consumer’s valuation function. Note that if Vol(Ct) < δ
n, then
there must be some dimension in which widthi(Ct) < δ/2. When we detect such a dimension, we fix
that coefficient, and restart the algorithm by maintaining a consistent set in one fewer dimension.
Hence, at each epoch, we maintain a set of consistent valuation functions restricted to those
indices among those that are not yet fixed, and predict according to the composite of the valuation
vectors sampled from this consistent set, together with the fixed indices. Every time we fix an
index, a new epoch begins. The volume of the consistent set can never go below δn within an
epoch, and since we fix an index at the end of every epoch, there can be at most n such epochs.
The only computationally challenging step is sampling a point uniformly at random from the
consistent set Ct, which can be done in polynomial time using the technique of [5].
Theorem 4. Algorithm ExogLearnVal runs in polynomial time per round, and with probability 1−
β, makes at most O
(
n2 log(1/δ) + n
√
log(1/β) log(1/δ)
)
mistakes over any sequence of adaptively
chosen price vectors.
Proof. We prove a bound on the number of mistakes made by the algorithm in a single epoch
(recall that each epoch ends when a new coordinate is fixed). Since there are only n coordinates,
and hence at most n epochs, our final mistake bound is at most n times the mistake bound per
epoch, giving the theorem.
Consider an epoch i in which there remain d ≤ n unfixed coordinates. We will track the d-
dimensional volume of the sets Ct during this epoch. Let Si be the first stage of the epoch, and
let Fi be the final stage of the epoch. Note that Vol(CSi) = 1 (because CSi is always initialized
to be the d-dimensional hypercube). Note also that for Si ≤ t < Fi, any hypothesis in Ct that
leads to an incorrect prediction of xt is eliminated from Ct+1. Hence, if Mt is the indicator random
variable specifying whether our algorithm makes a mistake at round t, it is also the indicator
random variable specifying whether our algorithm sampled a hypothesis that will be eliminated in
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Algorithm ExogLearnVal(B, δ)
Fixed = ∅, wi = 0 for all i. . Initialize the fixed coordinates, initially none
C0 = {z ∈ [0, 1]n | 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1 ∀i} . Initialize the set of consistent hypotheses
for t = 0 to T do
Observe pt
zt ← sample1(Ct) . Sample a valuation uniformly from consistent set
vt = (zt−Fixed, wFixed) . Combine sampled and fixed coefficients
Predict xˆt ∈ arg maxx·pt≤B x · vt . Predict according to sampled valuation
xt ← consumer(pt)
Ct+1 = Ct
for i, j 6∈ Fixed | xti > xtj do . Update Constraints
Ct+1 = Ct+1 ∩ {zi/pti ≥ zj/ptj}
for i 6∈ Fixed, j ∈ Fixed | xti > xtj do . Update Constraints
Ct+1 = Ct+1 ∩ {zi/pti ≥ wj/ptj}
for j 6∈ Fixed, i ∈ Fixed | xti > xtj do . Update Constraints
Ct+1 = Ct+1 ∩ {wi/pti ≥ zj/ptj}
if There exists i 6∈ Fixed such that widthi(Ct+1) < δ/2 then . Start a new Epoch
for Each i 6∈ Fixed such that widthi(Ct+1) < δ/2 do . Fix each determined coordinate
Fix(i)
Ct+1 = {z ∈ [0, 1]n−|Fixed| | 0 ≤ zi ≤ 1 ∀i 6∈ Fixed} . Re-initialize in the unfixed
coordinates
procedure Fix(i)
Fixed = Fixed ∪ {i}
z ← sample(Ct+1) . Sample a value for coordinate i
wi = round
2(zi/δ) · δ . Round sampled value to nearest discrete value and fix it
1sample is any polynomial algorithm for sampling uniformly at random from a convex polytope.
2round(x) rounds to the nearest integer.
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the next round. Because we sample our hypothesis in round t at random from Ct, we have:
E[Mt] = 1− Vol(Ct+1)
Vol(Ct)
Note that we can write the volume of CFi as a telescoping product:
Vol(CFi) = Vol(CSi)
Fi−1∏
t=Si
Vol(Ct+1)
Vol(Ct)
=
Fi−1∏
t=Si
Vol(Ct+1)
Vol(Ct)
Note also that before the end of an epoch, the width of Ct in every coordinate is at least δ/2. Hence
we know Vol(CFi) ≥ δd ≥ δn. Combining these facts, we can write:
δn ≤
Fi−1∏
t=Si
Vol(Ct+1)
Vol(Ct)
=
Fi−1∏
t=Si
(1− E[Mt]) ≤
Fi−1∏
t=Si
exp(−E[Mt]) = exp
−E
Fi−1∑
t=Si
Mt

Solving for the expected number of mistakes made in a single epoch, we find that:
E
 Fi∑
t=Si
Mt
 ≤ E
Fi−1∑
t=Si
Mt
+ 1 ≤ 1 + n ln(1
δ
)
= O
(
n ln
(
1
δ
))
Now consider the expected number of mistakes made by our algorithm for its entire run, t ∈
{1, . . . , T}. Since we can partition each time step into one of at most n epochs, and have a bound
on the expected number of mistakes in each epoch, by linearity of expectation, we have:
E
[
T∑
t=1
Mt
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
 Fi∑
t=Si
Mt
 ≤ n+ n2 ln(1
δ
)
= O
(
n2 ln
(
1
δ
))
Note that each of the random variables Mi is independent and bounded in [0, 1]. We can
therefore apply a multiplicative Chernoff bound. For any  < 1, we have:
Pr
[
T∑
t=1
Mt ≥ (1 + )E
[
T∑
t=1
Mt
]]
≤ exp
(
−2
3
E
[
T∑
t=1
Mt
])
Setting the right hand side to be at most β, plugging in our bound on E
[∑T
t=1Mt
]
and solving
for  allows us to take
 = O
(√
ln(1/β)
n2 ln(1/δ)
)
Plugging this into the Chernoff bound proves the theorem.
(Theorem 4)
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
Our work provides efficient learning algorithms for two new preference learning models. We leave as
an open question whether it is possible to remove our assumptions of discretized and lower-bounded
valuations. In the price-setting model, one might also wish to devise an algorithm in which the
merchant can approximately optimize profits during the learning phase. Finally, there are several
variants of our model to be considered in future work, such as multiple buyers with different utility
functions, and stochastic budgets that vary daily.
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